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STATEMFNI "' ""!" '-"""I |nN
Jurisdiction is conferred
Rule 3(a)

litr-ih Rules
i I1

ppellate court pursuant to
Appellate Procedure and §78-2-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the Court's Order premature?

A Motion to Dismiss is

a matter granted with great caution in negligence cases.

The

appellate court has the right to review this action to determine
whether the caution was taken or whether the facts presented should
have been allowed to be considered by the trier of fact.
2.

Did this incident fall within the bounds of the release

signed by Plaintiff?
3.

Does the case law cited by Defendant and relied upon by

the Court exclude gross negligence and/or willful and wanton
conduct?
4.

Are the terms of the release clear enough to qualify as

an exculpatory clause under the circumstances of this injury?
Ambiguous clauses in a release are matters of fact and must be
reviewed in favor of those facts being considered by the jury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of a "bungee" jumping incident which
occurred on July 21, 1994. Plaintiff, a novice at bungee jumping,
advised all parties that this was her first time. She advised the
worker at the ticket booth who required that she sign a release and
advised the worker on the platform.

On the platform prior to

jumping, she asked the attendant if she could hold on to the
supporting cord.

The attendant told her that she could and
2

specifically

instructed her where to place her hands.

Upon

jumping, a sliding sleeve over the cord struck her hands and caused
substantial and permanent damage to her fingers.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Was the Court's Order premature?

The Plaintiff had no

opportunity to engage in discovery to determine standards of care
in the industry, to determine if there were any governmental
standards applicable to the equipment or to determine the training
or state of mind of the applicable attendants.
2.

Did this incident fall within the bounds of the release

signed by Plaintiff? There is a substantial question as to whether
this particular set of circumstances fell within the "four corners"
of the release.

This is a factual question for the trier of fact

and not a question of law.
3.

Does the case law cited by Defendant and relied upon by

the Court exclude gross negligence and/or willful and wanton
conduct?

Plaintiff believes that the case law does exclude this

type of conduct and that Plaintiff is entitled to have a trier of
fact determine the level of negligence or conduct prior to a ruling
on the merits.
4.

Are the terms of the release clear enough to qualify as

an exculpatory clause under the circumstances of this injury?

3

Cases believed to be determinative of the stated issues are as
follows:
Bovce v. West. 862 P.2d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
Hewitt v. Miller. 521 P.2d 244,
ARGUMENT
A.

Defendant's Motion is Premature

Plaintiff had just filed its Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss
at that time was premature.

Plaintiff believes that discovery

would have provided testimony that the actions of the employees of
Defendant fall outside the normal purview of a general release.
Plaintiff was entitled to obtain that discovery before a Motion to
Dismiss could be entertained.
A Motion to Dismiss should be granted with great caution in
negligence cases.

See Bowen v. Riverton. 656 P.2d 434 (1982).

The question of the sliding sleeve on the cord which caused
Plaintiff's injury, safety factors, training of employees, action
of employees or agents, or whether they meet governmental standards
are questions that further require discovery.
Plaintiff did not allege violation of appropriate governmental
standards at this point due to that information not being in
Plaintifffs hands at the time. Plaintiff is certainly entitled to
enter into discovery to determine whether the equipment referred to
in the Complaint was defective.
4

B.

This Incident Did Not Fall Within the
Bounds of the Release

Plaintiff points to the portion of the release which reads as
follows:
I am hereby aware that shock cord jumping. . .is a hazardous
activity. . .and I am voluntarily participating in this
activity with full knowledge of the danger involved. . .
Plaintiff will testify that following the explicit instructions of
the Defendant with the resultant permanent injury to her hands was
not within the purview of the "full knowledge" referred to in the
release.
The question of whether the "full knowledge" referred to in
the release should have included the knowledge of possible loss of
use of the hands due to a sleeve on the cord is a jury question and
not the basis for a Motion to Dismiss.
The same argument applies to the portion of the release which
states:
•I
shall not make a claim against. . .Free Spirit
Recreation. . .for injury. . .caused. . .as a result of my
participation in shock cord jumping.
Again, there is a question as to whether this type of injury was
foreseeable as participation in shock cord jumping, especially
given the peculiar facts of this incident. There is a question of
whether this was participation by the employee which is outside of
the purview of the release.
5

Plaintiff contends that the paragraph of the release which
states:
I am in good physical health or have notified Free Spirit
Recreation of any physical impairments, or limitations (i.e.;
history of any heart or back or neck problems, SI joint,
pelvis, eye surgery, etc.) that may affect my physical and
mental well being during or after shock cord jumping
activities. . .
would give a reasonable person the basis to believe, together with
a lay person's understanding of the forces involved in shock cord
jumping, that these are the areas of the body at risk. There is no
reason

to

believe

that

a

participant

would

lose

a

finger.

Interpretation is certainly an issue for the jury, especially where
there was an express instruction from an employee.
The cases cited by Defendant involve injuries within the
reasonable

expectations

of

a

person

participating

in

those

activities.
C.

Defendants Are Not Entitled to Unconscionable Provisions
The law is well settled that the general principle of allowing

persons to contract for themselves has its limits. An established
exception is that if a contract is unconscionable, in whole or in
part, the court may, on equitable grounds, refuse to enforce the
unconscionable provisions, or it may construe the contract to avoid
an unconscionable result.

Biesinaer v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801, 803

(Utah); Russell v. Park Citv Utah Corp.. 548 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah);

6

Carlson v. Hamilton. 332 P.2d 989, 991; See also 5 Corbin on
Contracts. 1057, 1068, 1075.
Allowing unfettered freedom from liability certainly falls in
the unconscionable area. This would allow employees of a facility
similar

to Defendant

significantly

to rough-house

on the platform

or use

inferior cords causing death or serious injury

without fear of any responsibility.
Plaintiff reiterates and incorporates herein by reference her
initial response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
This is apparently a case of first impression in Utah, since
the bulk of Defendant's references are from outside jurisdiction.
The two Utah cases cited refer to indemnity agreements which are
totally different from the present case.

Review of Defendant's

cites indicate other factors which the Court must consider.
In Boyce v. West, 862 P.2d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), the
Court states:
Exculpatory clauses are strictly construed and must be clear
if the release from liability is to be enforced.
Boyce at p. 595
The same case provides an out for gross negligence:
[Boyce] further contends there are issues of material fact
whether the defendants were grossly negligent.
If
[defendant's] acts fell greatly below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk
of harm, the releases are unenforceable.
Boyce, at 597
7

Plaintiff has continually contended that Defendant's agent, by
specifically instructing Plaintiff where to put her hands, and
reassuring her that no injury would result, acted at least in a
grossly negligent manner, if not wanton and/or malicious.

Again,

this is a question for the finder of fact to determine.
The court in Hewitt v. Miller. 521 P.2d 244 stated:
The court also recognized that the release in question is not
a valid defense to factually supported causes of action based
upon. . .wilful and wanton misconduct. . .
Hewitt, at 245.
Plaintiff again reiterates that the evidence, through discovery,
will show that Defendant's agents acted in a wilful and wanton
manner, or at least were grossly negligent.

Hewitt also referred

to the injury as being "an inherent danger" to the sport involved.
Here, the injury to the fingers could not be considered to be "an
inherent danger" and therefore the release is invalid.
In Schutkowski v. Carey. 725 P.2d 1057, also conditioned the
imposition

of

the

release

"subject

to

willful

misconduct

limitations" (Schutkowski. at 1059) . The same holds true for Cain
v. Cleveland Parachute Training Center. 457 N.E.2d 11185, Milligan
v.

Big

Valley

Corp..

754

P.2d

1063,

Lee

v.

Allied

Sports

Associates. Inc.. 209 N.E.2d 329, Moss v. Fortune. 340 S.W.2d 902,
LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Board. 360 N.E.2d 605, Owen v. Vic
Tanny's

Enterprises.

199

N.E.2d
8

280, Haines

v.

St.

Charles

Speedway, Inc., 874 F.2d 572, and DeBoer v. Florida Offroaders
Driver's Ass' n. . Inc., 622 So.2d 1134.
Defendant cannot contend that the release excuses Defendant
from gross or wilful or wanton misconduct which would fall into the
category of being against public policy and be therefore an
exclusion to all the cases cited by the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the Trial
Court's granting of Defendant's Motion on the grounds that there
are material issues of fact which need to be resolved by a jury at
trial, or, in the alternative, that Defendant's Motion be denied
with

leave

re-submit

their motion

after

discovery

has been

obtained.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of December, 1995
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES

RONALD E. DALBY
/
Attorneys for Appellant
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